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CHINA:

A NEW RELATIONSHIP

Commencement Address by Senator Mike Mansfield (D., Montana)
Rocky Mountain College, Billings, Montana
Monday, May 29, 1972, 9 : 30a.m., M. S . T.

I would like to shar e with you on this day which is
of great Lmportance to you some thoughts of world affairs.

One

aspect of this subject, in particular, begs for your understanding
and attention.
a nd China.

That is the r elationshi p between the United States

It is uppe r most in my mind, at this time, because I

have only this month returned from a journey to Peking.

The

'mpress ions of the visit to that capital and several other Chinese
cities a re still very vivid .

So, too, are my discuss ions with

leaders of the People' s Republic .
This is a notable year in U. S.- Chi na r elations .

The

fi rst significant steps i n 25 years have been taken towards a
general revision of dealings with Chi na .

The initiative was

long overdue and, hence the backlog of unfi nished business is
very heavy.
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Almost a quarter of a century ago, we cut ourse lves
off, as a matter of

de l~ berate

policy, fr om all norma l re lations

wi th the largest nation on earth.

We did so by misreading or

d i stort i ng, in an official sense> the im plicat·ons of the Chinese
revolut ion which brought a new government to Peking in 1949 .
Thereafter, we acted on the legal pretense that the Peo ple's
Republic of China did not exi st.

Even as we pretended it was not

there, we invested heavily in an elaborate system of costly constra i nts to curtail that government.
The price of this detachment from reality was not
trivial.

Quite apart from billions spent for counterpoises to

China throughout Asia, our present involvement i n Viet Nam can
be considered, in large measure, to be part of the pr i ce of this
constra i nt.

So, too, was our earlier i nvolvement in Korea.

These and other military actions were undertaken in the
name of a policy called "containment " wh ic h was based on a set of
assumptions about the nature of events i n China, as we guessed or

persuaded ourselves to believe them to be.

These assumptions were

made 'n a vacuum because of our isolation from the Chinese mainland.
Not surprisingly, many of them turned out to be highly inaccurate .
The tragic cost of the miscalculations can be stated
in terms of the lives lost, the bodies maimed and the resources
squandered all around the rimlands of Asia, particularly in Korea
and Indochina.

To be sure, we cannot

est~mate

what the alternat·ve

costs might have been had we acted on more accurate assumptions,
or had we taken no action at all.

Simply on the basis of what

did happen, however, history may well record these miscalculations
regarding China, as among the most costl y of all time .
I might say, parenthetically, that we are at a crucial
point, at the present time, in determining whether we will pers ist
in this mistaken course.
the past few weeks.
responses

wh ~ch

I refer to events i n VietNam during

The new U. S. air and sea actions are vestigial

arise from the old , not the new China policy whic h

- 4 was signaled by the President's visit to Peking .

Whatever the

success of these new war measures, they wil l not alter in any
wa y the overwhelming need of this nati on to disengage completely
from the Indochina conflict .

We need to do so, not to satisfy

Hanoi or Peking or Moscow, but in order to serve our own national
interests .

If we have learned anything to date from thi s conflict,

it is that we have no national stake in that conflict except an
end to further casualties and the return of the orisoners of war
and the missing in action.

The course 0f action best calculated

to serve these nat i onal needs remains to negotiate the best political solution without further recourse to arms and to get out of
Indochina, lock, stock and barrel .
But, to return to the central theme of my remarks, it
is revea ling t o ask ourselves how we became involved in Viet Nam
i n the first place .

How did we permit ourselves to make such

faulty commitments with such disastrous consequences?

We get

..
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some clues, I think, when we rev i ew the spectrum of our relationship with China over the las t two centuries .
More than with other nations, our relationship with
Chi na has been subject t J the ebb and flow of popular myth.

We

have tended to oscillate from one overs implified view of China
t o another .

For almost two centuri es, China has been viewed ,

alternately, as benign or virulent, friendly or host ile, wise
or foolish.
Like the "yin" and "yang '' of Chi nese cosmology which
holds that life i s the product of a dualism of o pposites, our
image of China has gone from one extreme to the other .

On the

one hand, there has been the image of the China of wi sdom , intelligence, i ndustry, piety, stoicism and strength .

That is the

benign China of Marco Polo and Pearl S. Buck; i t i s the China of
the Charlie Chan movies and of the stor i es of heroic res i stance
to Jaoan in the 1930's .

..
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On the other hand, there has been the image of the
Ch'na of cruelty, barbarism, violence, and faceless hordes.
This is the China of drum-head trials, opium dens, bandits,
summary executions, Fu Manchu, and the Boxer Rebellion.
In the late 18th century, we looked up to China as an
ancient civilization- - super ior in many aspects of technology,
culture, and social order and surrounded by an air of splendid
and

imper~al

mystery .

In that period, the China trade was sought

eagerly by the Clipper ships and Chinese produce was h'ghly valued
notably along the Eastern Seaboard and in Europe.
Respect turned to contempt, however, with China's
quick defeat in the OpiQm War of 1840.

There followed acts of

humiliation of China such as our participation in extra-territorial
treaty rights and the Chinese Exclusion Act of the last half of
the 19th century.
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In theearly 2Jth century, attitudes sh:fted again
benevolence.

t~

American missionaries of many faiths made China

a favored f'eld for proselytizing and educat ion .

In this

per~od,

the Chinese became, for this nation, a guided, guarded, and adored
people.
Chinese resistance to the Japanese invasion in 1937
produced another shift from benevolence to admirat5.on.

At the

end of the Second World War, admiration was displaced by disfrustati~n,

appointment and

as the wart ime truce between Nationalist

and Communist forces collapsed in internal strife.

This nation

became profoundly disenchanted with China, a d i senchantment which
was replaced abruptly in 1949 by hostil i ty .

U. S. Secretaries of

State turned their backs on Chinese leaders and spoke of the mehace
of

11

Chinese hordes 11 as predecessors had spoken with similar re -

vulsion of the

11

yellow peril . 11
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The hostility was la rgely a react· n, of c · urse, to
the coming to power of a Communist regime on the Chi nese

ma~nland .

We were not only d'smayed by this development, we saw it almost
as a national affront .

Peking was viewed as a treacherous ex-

tens ion of the Soviet steamroller wh i ch had reduced Eastern and
Central Europe to subse r vience at the end of World War II .

Ch ina

became in our eyes the Eastern puppet of world communism, to be
manipulated by strings pulled i n Moscow .
After Ch i nese forces intervened in the war in Korea
where, incidentally, Mao Tse- tung lost h: s eldest son, U.

s.

policy was cast anew on the premise that the government on the
Chi nese mainland was an aggr essor .

It was seen as ready to use

force to impose inte r national Communism anywhere in Asia .

Con-

versely, it was assumed t hat if the endorsement of the free nations
were wi thheld, this r eg i me whi ch was sa i d to be "alien" to the
Chinese people would wither and collapse.

- 9 On this premise, i t was rationalized that recogniti on
must not be extended to Peki ng.

Instead, the official Amer i can

view was that the Chi nese Nat ional Government, wh i ch had retreated
to the island of Taiwan, continued to speak for all of China.

We

cut off trade with the Chinese mainland and d i d whatever coul d be
done to encourage other countri es to fol l ow suit.

In a similar

fashion, a diplomatic campaign was conducted year after year
against the seat i ng of the Chi nese People's Republic i n the United
Nations.
We drew an arc of military alliances on the seaward
side of China a nd undergirded them with the deployment of mass i ve
U. S. military power in bases throughout the Western Paci f i c.
of billions of dollars were expended i n this process.

Tens

Much of

this immense outpour i ng of effort and money seems incredible now
in the light of the Pres i dent's recent v i sits to Peking and t o
Moscow .

Yet, it has conti nued fo r 20 years and, of c ourse, is

still going on, no tably, in Indochina.

- 10 -

As has been suggested, this last quarter century of
China policy has been characterized by delusion and miscalculat ion .
We assumed, for example, that the Chinese Communists would be unab l e
to govern.

We assumed that the Peking government would be an ex-

tension of Soviet Communism and a will ing accomplice to Soviet
purpose and design.

And we assumed that the Chinese government

would be bent on territorial aggrandizement.
All of these assumpt ions have proved to be erroneous.
In the first place, of the numerous div isions which have arisen
within the Communist wor l d, the differences between Mosc ow and
Peking have been the most significant.

They so remain today

although the rasp ing edges of the conf lict appear somewhat tempered
by the periodic flare -ups of the war in Viet Nam.
At the same time, the government of the People's Republic
has not only survived, it has
effective leadership .

~ rovided

the Chinese people with

Chinese society has achieved a considerable
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degree of economic, scientific and social progress.

A modern

technology has been developed wh ich is sophisticated enough to
turn out products ranging from needles and hand - tools to thermonuclear devices, earth satel lites and the rockets to place them
in orbit .

A powerful national momentum has been generated which

is proving sufficient to supply an enormous population with the
wherewithal of decent survival and an improv ing livel ihood .
Notwithstanding assumptions to the contrary, the Chinese
government has not shown any great eagerness to use its own armed
forces to soread its control abroad .

Where Chinese armies have

been employed they have been used to assert traditional territorial
claims, or in express ion of concern for the safety of China's
borders.
ventures.

China has not become enmeshed in foreign military ad In Viet Nam, for example, the Chi nese military involve-

ment has been per ipheral .

There is Chinese equipment i n South

Viet Nam but there a re no Chinese battal ions .

In North Viet Nam
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reports have ·ndicated the presence, from time to time, not of
Chinese combat units, but of labor troops engaged in repa i ring
bomb damage to roads, railroads, br i dges and the like .
Chinese actions in Tibet, and along the Himalayan
frontier with India, are often cited as examples of militant
Communist aggression.

Neverthe l ess, for centur jes , Tibet has

been un iversa lly regarded as falling within Ch ina 's over-all
boundaries .

If the Peking government claims that Tibet belongs

to Ch na, so, too, does the Chi nese

Nat ~onal

Government on Taiwan.

India also acknowledges such to be the case and American policy
has never officially recognized Tibet as other than Chinese
territory.
Even in Korea, the direct Chinese military involvement
did not beg i n until United Nat j ons forces approached China's
borders.

In any event, the last Chinese batallions left North

Korea years ago.

- 13 Look:ng ahead, it would seem to me that Chinese energies
and resources are going to be

s~

preempted by internal needs over

the next two decades that there is little likelihood that China
could post a serious milita ry danger

t~

the United States even if

that were the inclinat ion.
The evidence , in short, is ample to dispel some of the
most alarming assumptions on wh ich our past policies have been
based .

Of course, there is an immense potential danger in China.

There is also an immense potential danger in every other powerful
nat;on i n a

w~rld

which has not yet lea rned how to maintain

c•vilized survival in a nuc l ear age except on the razor's edge .
Insofar as Ch"na is concerned, the fundamental question for us
is not so much whether it i s a danger, but whether our policies
will act to alleviate or to exacerbate the danger.

- 14 In my

judgment ~

these pol i cies can alleviate the danger

only to the extent that they are based on premises that correspond
more nearly to real·ties than has been the case in the past.
will serve no useful purpose to flail at windmills.
have~

ing

in 1972, at last penetrated the shroud of

China~

It

Now that we

~bscurity

surround-

there is reason to hope that our judgments and actions

regarding China and Asia, henceforth, will be better informed .
In

th~s

new phase of our relat:ons with China, we must

beware, of course, that the old pendulum of myth does not now
swing to the other

extreme~

thereby creating a new image of China

which is as unreal as the old.

We must guard against becoming too

enamoured of the splendors of a newly revived amity.

Banquets

and toasts and shark's fin soup do no t of themselves assure a new
order of world affairs .
To keep the pendulum in equilibrium in our current approach to China, it woul d be well to heed a rule laid down by
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Lord

Palmerst~n,

the prime M·n·ster

o~

Great Britain in the

1860's, who declared :
''We have no eternal allies, and we
have no perpetual enemies.
Our experiences in postwar World War II

II

rel3t~ons

with Germany

and Japan underscore this observation .
We have not always been very astute about defining
where our real interests lie .

We have often tended to confuse

them wjth fleeting and transitory images
animosity .

~f

friendliness or

This is all too true in the case of China where, for

25 years, we have been obsessed with the assumed threat of a perpetual enemy.

In fact, we might well have avoided the untold

misery and loss of life and re sources of the peripheral war in
Indochina, had we forgone the poses of power and, instead, taken
a harder view of our national interests .

- 16 Wh ile we cannot identify nationa l interests with exactitude, we do have :t w:thin our means to determine much
where

~t

is that they do not lie.

in th·.s connect:on .

~ore

clearly

The President has shown the way

Even before his vi s i t to Peki ng, he had laid

the groundwork for reestablishing more norma l contact w:th the
People's Republic of China by the removal of di scriminatory restr iction on travel of Americans to the Chinese mainla nd and by end ing
the embargo on trade with China.

The embargo had been imposed

during the Korean War and was of a des ign so tight as to exclude
even chop- sticks .

The fact is , however, that for two decades, it

had had no economic impact on Chi na and had served only to injure
our own traders .

By ending the boycott on the eve of his visit

China
to China, the Pres i dent removed what was, at most, an ir r itant to I
but which would have hampered his efforts to br i ng about the
beginnings of a reconciliation.
As i t was, Pres ident Nixon was able to l ay the groundwork
for the growth of contact between the t wo nations.

The chances
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are good that the months and years ahead will see a gradual increase
in exchanges between Chtna and the United States in med'cine and
health, sc·ence,

journal~sm,

athletics, the arts and other pursuits.

An increase in trade is also to be anticipated .

The

Chinese are 'n an excellent position to move forward in this connection.

It has been their pract1ce to keep imports and exports, world-

wide, in rough balance .
debt.

They have neither external nor inte rna l

They have ample exchange reserves .

Their inter national re-

putat·on for integrity and re liability ·n commercial transatjons
is already very good .

A great range of ch·nese products is avail-

able for sale in the world markets and the Chinese also have a
substantial shopping list for imports wh{ch will help to speed
their own development and strengthen their economic self-reliance.
Exchanges can take place, in my judgment, even though
the issue of Taiwan remains, finally, to be resolved.

President

Nixon has acknowledged as valid, Peking's claim that the island

- 1S is part

Ch:na .

o~

That

claim~

Chinese government on Taiwan.
States will not pursue a
go ahead

~n

incidentally, is sustained by the
With the assurance that the United

two-Ch~na

policy, Pek·ng is prepared to

re estab 1 ishing contact w·th this

nati~n

wh"le exploring

in its own fashion the road to reunif cat;on of the island with
the mainland.
Beyond exchanges between China and the United States,
there loom large r ouestions of peace and security in the Western
Pacific.

Even as we meet here

today~

weawait the

consequences

of the latest escalat5on of the U. S. involvement in Viet Nam as
we ll as the full impo rt of the Pres·dent's discussions in Moscow.
One can only hope that we have seen the last res ort to reta liation
in

Indochina~

the final burst of th is wasting conflict and that

progress can now be expected toward a genuine political settlement .
In all

cando r~

the record of this tragic war provides

little grounds for optimism in thjs resoect .
Cambodia d'd not produce peace.

The invas · on of

Nor d"d the invasion of Laos.

Nor d'd the earlier bombing enterprises over North Viet Nam .
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Peace was the prQmise attached, in turn, to each of
these

esca:at~~ns o~

the U. S. involvement .

not to the oromised peace but to
prisoners of war, more miss:ng in
in

-.a

more kille d and maime d, more

act ~on,

to pr oduce mor e and more

ex9end~tures

Each , in turn, led

mo re and more billions
devastat~on

throughout

Indochina .
The end of this war has yet to
yet when it will come .

We would do

we ~J. ,

c~me

and it is not clear

nevertheless, to begin

to examine the ooss · bilit'es of a new secur·ty system, based on
the

real :t~es

of the 70 ' s .

Those realit"es urge us to seek, in

my judgment, an equ ilib r ium of this nat ion's i nterests with those
of China, J aoan, the Soviet Union and the smaller nations of the
Western Pacif"c.

All have a stake in the peace of the reg i on.

The restorat ion of CQntact w·th Ch:na furthers the
ooss·bil:ty tnat at some time

tr:~a rt :te

d i scuss·ons might be

held between China , J apan , and the Un jted States, if not quadripartite

ta :~s,

wh ich would also include the Soviet UniQn.

A

-

2~

-

development of this kind could do much to allay unfounded mutual
fears and to begin to come to grips with the question of adjustment
of valid

nat~onal

interests.

It could provide i ns ights i nto such

vital questi)ns as the intentions of the various powers i n the
Western Pacific and how they relate to one another, the economic
needs of the Asian nations, and the prospects for curbing nuclear
conflict .

Most important, such discuss·ons might provide a vehicle

for general stabili zat i on of the

Indoch~na

peninsula and Southeast

Asia in the post-war era.
Adjustments of this kind require fresh perspectives.
We need t o see the situat i on as it is today, ndas it appeared 20
years ago in the cataclysmic upheaval of the Chi nese revolution.
We need to see the situation not through the fog of an old and
stagnant

host~lity

but in the light of the endur ing interests of

the United States i n the Western Pacific which are no less than a
peace of equality and mutuality wh lch will permi t a flower 1ng of
relat >ons with all As ian nations.
more.

Nor, may I add, are they any

- 21 -

I see great
deeoly of the

~ssues

re~evance

in young men and women thinking

wh'ch d:v·de Ch'na and the United States to

determine how they can be recast
Unli~e

my

generat~on,

n new and uncluttered molds .

you have already learned much about Asia .

You have a greater awareness of its
and to the world .
o~ nati~na1

almost

mportance to this nation

Fur ther more , you have not had the experience

trauma in moving abruptly

~awn·ng

enchant~ent.

1

fr~m

an era marked by an

benevolence toward China to one of thorough
You were s9ared the

r~erce

d~s-

hostilities which rent

this nat·on "nternally, as a sense of 1,o1armth, sympa"thy, and secur·ty
regarding China gave way to fee1:ngs of revu'sion , hatred and insecur·ty .
You young Ame r icans and your counterparts in China wi.ll
l "ve

y~ur

adult years in an era tn wh"ch much of the

h "story '.-;i.l' be \-Jritten 1n the Paci.fic .

Wh1t y?u

d~,

w~rld ' s

how you

relate to one another --Chinese and Amer·cans- - will have much to
dJ w·th whether or n?t that h'story is wr:tten in terms of peace
and c·vi.lized human survtval .
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I have
Marines :n the

~een Ch~na

192~ 's.

off and on since I served there in the

I have seen you, your parents and your

grandparents much closer up and for a much longer per·od of time.
I am confident about a future that be ongs to your
generati~n,

bJth in China and in this CJuntry of Jurs.

This

Republic is worthy of your best efforts not only in terms of
developing ch·nese and U. S . relatiJns, but
entire wJrld.

regard to the

You can do no more than try to achieve mutual

understanding and a peace with all peoples .
do no less .

w ~th

You can and should

When I think of Rocky Mountain College, I think not so much of
your outstanding President, your excellent faculty, your spacious grounds,
your fine reputation, or your student body, but of a young man whom I met
years ago on my first vis it to this campus.
His name was Dennis Casey.

He came from Lewistown, Montana.

,.
'I

He was the leader of the Rocky Mountain College Marching Band, which
numbered thirteen on that occasion, a band which escorted me from the gate
to the college. I was very proud on that occasion to be escorted by the
nucleus of what later became a bigger - but not better - marching band, and
very pleased to make the acquaintance of, and to be friends with, Dennis Casey.
Since that time I have visited your campus on a number of occasions
and every time I come here I think of Dennis Casey, who laid down his life
in Vietnam, and who represented so much of what was good in Montana and our
Republic.

To me Dennis Casey is the symbol of all that is good, fine, and

outstanding in this Institution, and when I speak of Dennis Casey, I am speaking of
your President, your faculty, and your student body.

He was a good man, he

was a decent man, and I valued his friendship more than I can put into words .
So, to a former student and a friend, may I, with your permission,
dedicate this Commencement Address to Dennis Casey as well as to the Class
of 1972?
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